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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents an innovative application of post-earnings announcement drift in the 
PSI-20 from 2011-2017. We show that abnormal returns exist, and are more significant when we 
incorporate momentum and liquidity factors for different earnings surprises. Moreover, we 
implement an investment strategy, including transaction costs, which takes advantage of such 
abnormal returns. A hedging strategy designed according to the stock’s proximity to 52-week high 
and earnings surprise yields an info Sharpe of 1.78 and a 65.12% accuracy. Finally, we show that 
a long-portfolio on PSI-20 equities with a 20-day holding period presents unsatisfactory results 
when incorporating transaction costs. 
Keywords: Post-earnings Announcement Drift, 52-week high, Earnings Surprise, Liquidity 
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I. Introduction 
Over the past few years, research papers on post-earnings announcement drift1 (henceforth 
PEAD) have often relied on US and the most liquid European equity markets (France, Germany, 
Spain and United Kingdom). Current literature available2 regarding capital markets reaction to 
earnings announcements in PSI-203 is not substantial to fully comprehend the subject, making 
further investigation very attractive. Portuguese stock market analysis also brings a further 
advantage grounded in its low liquidity and poor financial information quality when compared to 
other European markets. Most of these attempts to statistically prove abnormal returns tend to 
forget the investment side of the research. Additionally, research papers in PSI-20 do not exist after 
2009 financial crisis.  
This paper departs from previous research on PEAD in three ways. First, we focus in the 
Portuguese stock market, with a lower liquidity when compared to other European and US markets. 
Second, we observe a post-crisis period 4 that might have incorporated a new risk aversion factor 
that could bear for the following decade. This paper examines whether PEAD abnormal returns are 
just attributable to a given sub-period or profitable over time. Third, we develop, when applicable, 
a trading strategy according to stock’s liquidity and momentum for different earnings surprise 
(positive, negative and no surprise). One of the main objectives of implementing such strategy is 
to observe whether an event-study method would overestimate abnormal returns since it does not 
incorporate transaction costs. This paper pretends to observe if profits continue to exist after 
implementing such strategies or if transaction costs eliminate that abnormal gain. Therefore, the 
                                       
1 PEAD is the tendency for a stock’s cumulative abnormal return to drift in the direction of an earnings surprise for a given time 
period following the announcement. 
2 Wilton (2002), Alves and Santos (2005), Duque and Pinto (2005), Romacho and Cidrais (2007), Lourenço and Coelho (2008). 
3 PSI-20 is the reference Portuguese stock index and aggregates the 20 largest (nowadays, are just 18 companies) Portuguese 
companies trading in Euronext Lisbon.  
4 After 2009 mortgage crisis in United States of America. 
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main objective here is to substantiate if there are abnormal returns surrounding earnings 
announcement dates in PSI 20 from 2011-2015. If true, test the feasibility of such a model by 
implementing an Equity-Long Only and Equity Long-Short strategies from 2015-2017. 
II. Literature Review 
Contradictory views about PEAD are very common in authors trying to explore this subject, 
enhancing the pace at which ideas are changing. Take for example Fama (1970) which pointed out 
that capital markets are efficient if security prices, at any given time, fully reflect all available 
information and hence the impossibility of generating abnormal returns. Nevertheless, Fama (1998) 
reported that post-earnings announcement drift is a robust and persistent anomaly that goes against 
market semi-strong efficiency form and that occurs mainly in highly illiquid stocks. Post-earnings 
announcement drift is reported by many authors to represent a market anomaly. Ball and Brown 
(1968) were the first to notice that stock prices tended to drift upwards (downwards) after earnings 
announcements if the surprise is positive (negative). Of course, this constitutes a clear violation of 
the market efficiency hypothesis if one shows that abnormal returns are statistically significant. 
Authors like Beaver (1968) noticed that both trading activity and price volatility increased during 
the week surrounding earnings announcements meaning that earnings information brings 
additional value to the stock market. Posteriorly, May (1971) also noticed that price changes during 
the weeks of quarterly earnings announcements were, in fact, higher when compared to the average 
price change.  Joy et al. (1977) showed that unanticipated favorable quarterly earnings 
announcements showed a statistically significant relationship with abnormal price changes over 
the subsequent 26 weeks. The new information released about an equity’s fundamental or intrinsic 
value origins an intermediate stock price trend (Jones and Litzenberger, 1970). They confirmed 
that oscillations in the market’s general belief relative to the stock’s intrinsic value may cause price 
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corrections over time. These price adjustments are steady since those beliefs need to be gradually 
assimilated by investors and consequently increase stock’s momentum and attractiveness. A 
surprise in EPS reported by the firm (considering historical earnings trend) is estimated to cause 
positive revisions in the fundamental value of a given stock. Hence, creating positive price 
adjustments over time. The opposite rationale for earnings below expected is also valid.5 In a 
similar study, Bernard and Thomas (1989) determined that PEAD is consistent with a deferred 
response rather than a risk mismeasurement.6 In fact, decades later Chudek et al. (2011) and Truong 
(2010, 2011) concluded that PEAD is caused by a delayed assimilation of earnings information by 
the investors in the Canadian, New Zealand and Chinese equity market, respectively. Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008) also pointed out that earnings announcements convey relevant and essential 
market information since they seem to generate some market response. Their main results showed 
that the average quarterly earnings announcement is usually associated with abnormal price 
volatility. 
Shifting our focus to the European markets, Forner et al. (2009) reported that PEAD long-short 
strategies yield significant positive returns in the months after the earnings announcement in 
Spanish stock market, and make “things more difficult for the market efficiency hypothesis.” Liu 
et al. (2000) found significant evidence that suggests a drift in returns after earnings announcements 
by companies in the United Kingdom, and that market risk, size, book-to-market, price, cash 
earnings-to-price and number of analysts failed to explain PEAD phenomenon. The variable that 
better explained PEAD effect was the four-day return around earnings announcement. They 
showed that PEAD constituted a “clear rejection of the efficient market hypothesis” and that 
                                       
5 They analyzed two samples of stocks, with 510 companies in the first sample covering a period since 1962-1965. The second 
sample during the years 1964-1967 for 618 companies. Represents all the companies available from Quarterly Compustat tapes. 
6 Their sample included 84 792 firm-quarters of data for NYSE/AMEX firms between 1974 and 1986. They also performed 
additional tests on 15 457 firm-quarters of data for OTC stocks on the NASDAQ, in the period 1974-85. 
6 
 
investors failed to process earnings information efficiently. Forbes and Giannopoulos (2015) 
confirmed the existence of PEAD anomaly in the Greek market, and state that it increased after the 
adoption of the international financial reporting standards. On the other hand, Wael (2004) reported 
that abnormal returns dissipate within the first fifteen minutes in the Euronext Paris, though he 
emphasizes the fact that there are information asymmetry and bid-ask spread increases just after 
disclosing earnings information. Regarding the Portuguese Stock Market, some authors stand out. 
Wilton (2002), Pinto (2005) and Romacho et al. (2007) stated that, for the generality of the set of 
stocks, the market was efficient and therefore it was not possible to obtain abnormal profits. 
Nonetheless, Lourenço and Coelho (2008) argued that annual earnings announcements are strongly 
correlated with stock’s abnormal returns. Furthermore, Alves and Santos (2005) showed that the 
results obtained in their study indicate that earnings reporting had a significant impact on the 3, 5 
and 7 trading days following the announcement, resulting in abnormal price volatility and volume. 
As described, a substantial amount of literature presents that abnormal returns exist and that 
PEAD sustains in the medium/long term in US, Asia and Europe. Nonetheless, one must ensure if 
it is due to earnings specific information or if there are other variables that might influence the 
outcome. In fact, Santa-Clara et al. (2008) hypothesized that a significant share of the market 
reaction around the announcement date is attributable to non-earnings information. Following this 
general idea, one will consider how liquidity and momentum explain PEAD in stocks with positive, 
negative or no earnings surprise. Consensus does not exist among authors regarding PEAD and its 
correlation with earnings surprise. Chen et al. (2015) showed that there is a stronger positive pattern 
in price movement and that it persists for up to 250 days after the announcement in stocks that had 
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a positive surprise. On the other hand, Schmitz (2007) observed exactly the opposite, where he 
finds a larger drift for stock with bad news and a very short-term price drift for positive news. 7 
PEAD drift is witnessed mainly in highly illiquid stocks. Chordia (2009), using cross-sectional 
asset pricing tests, presented that the level of liquidity has an impact on the drift. Company size 
also affects the drift, however this effect could occur because size is a proxy for liquidity. 8 There 
is a correlation between liquidity and the amount of information available in the market, for every 
equity. Chen et al. (1997) attributed earnings surprise (positive, negative or neutral) and stock price 
drift to be more substantial when there is less quality and quantity of information. Portuguese stock 
market has fewer equity analysts tracking stocks and therefore exists a poor quantity/quality of 
available information.9Another variable that might influence the event-study results is momentum. 
The way investors’ trade stocks on earnings may depend on stock’s past performance. Goh and 
Jeon (2017) used 52-week as a proxy for momentum and concluded that stocks with positive 
(negative) earnings news do not experience a positive (negative) drift when stock prices are far 
(near) 52-week high. They used anchoring bias10 to explain PEAD in Korean stock market. 
III. Methodology 
A. Estimation and Event Window 
Due to the main purpose of this paper, we will only focus on quarterly earnings announcements, 
which are mandatory in Portugal. 11 Earnings announcement dates will be considered as the date 
in which there exists the first formal communication to the stock market. Let us define day 0 as the 
                                       
7 Note that both studies are performed in different countries: China and Germany. Thus, this could be a possible explanation for 
such different study conclusions’. The main idea here is that opinions about the same subject differ among the authors.  
8 Sample analyzed was composed of all NYSE and Amex companies between January 1972 and December 2005. 
9 Analysts tracking Portuguese stocks are very few. In fact, half of PSI-20 stocks do not have specific analysts following the stocks 
(this results for example, in no forecasted EPS or lack of market consensus regarding a stock’s target price). The others (most liquid 
ones) only have up to four analysts tracking them. Hence, making statistical inference and market analysis not significant. 
10 It is a cognitive bias for an individual to heavily rely on the initial piece of information given to make subsequent judgements. 
11 CMVM Regulation n. 11/98. 
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day of the earnings announcement for every single stock.12 Note that empirically this date changes 
across each firm. Recall that day 0 depends on whether the firm announces earnings after the market 
closes (AMC) or if it does before the market opens (BMO). The estimation window is used when 
performing OLS regression to find market model estimates’. Essentially, data is collected here to 
estimate the return on that given window. The event window considers the time-period surrounding 
the earnings announcement with two main components: pre and post announcement analysis.  
  
Figure 1. Representation of estimation and event window. 
 
The estimation window is given by 0 1 1T t T  
13 and the event window 1 2T t T  . Let us 
define the length of the estimation window as 1 0( 1)T T     and the length of the event window 
as 2 1T T   . Normally, the estimation and event window do not overlap to provide unbiased 
estimators for the parameters since they are not influenced by the returns surrounding the earnings 
announcement date. Considering day “0” as the event day, a 41-day event window is used, 
composed of 20 pre-announcement days and 20-post-announcement days, (-20, +20). The 
estimation window is defined by the interval (-371,-21), corresponding to the 250 trading days 
prior to the last day on the event window. It is the same method as Mackinlay (1997) uses when 
constructing his experimental sample. Pre-announcement interval is also considered because: i) 
could contribute to draw additional conclusions about stock’s behavior, ii) further investigation 
                                       
12 Technically, day 0 is the day in which earnings announcement affects the market. If AMC, the next day is considered. If BMO, 
the same day is taken into account.  
13 Hence, the interval
0 1T t T  . 
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might be attractive to understand if price movement is just noise or has some degree of inside 
trading and iii) does not affect current event study (instead of considering the total interval of 41 
days, one just considers a 21-day interval). However, for the purpose of this paper, we focus in the 
post-announcement interval (from day 0 until day 20). 
B. Dataset 
PSI-20 Index data was gathered from 01/01/2010 until 31/12/201714. Daily closing prices 
were downloaded from Bloomberg and log returns were calculated. Earnings announcement dates, 
information regarding after/before market announcement, earnings percentage surprise (negative, 
positive and neutral), companies’ market capitalization and 52-week high were also collected for 
the same date in all the companies of the Portuguese index.  
To compute average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns one will 
consider all the quarterly (Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4) announcements, from 2011-2015, with three 
different approaches: 
1) General sample with all the earnings announcements. 
2) General sample divided according to Earnings surprise: Estimated EPS > Actual 
Earnings (positive), Estimated EPS < Actual Earnings (negative) and no surprise (or 
absence of information). 
3) Earnings Surprise (positive, negative and no surprise) sample is further divided 
according to stock’s liquidity and momentum: 
                                       
14 This period selected was greater than the period of the event-study because it would be needed when incorporating 250-day 
estimation period and also to perform an out-of-sample back testing from 01/01/2015 until 01/01/2017. 
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a) High and low liquidity stocks. Market capitalization is used as a proxy for liquidity. 
PSI-20 sample is divided in a sample of stocks with i mcmc median and a sample with 
i mcmc median . 
15 imc  accounts for the average market cap in the last 252 trading days 
(1-year sample period) for a given stock i and mcmedian for the median market cap value 
in the total sample.  
b) Momentum: 52-week high is used as a proxy. Sample is divided into: i) Near to the 
high, ii) far from the high and iii) at the high. The groups are divided relative to the 
median proximity value to the high. One group accounts for all the stocks above the 
median value and the other for the stocks below the value. It is a similar rationale as 
Goh and Jeon (2017) use in their paper.  
The main purpose of these three approaches is to account for different scenarios that might 
exacerbate or hinder the existence of abnormal returns. As new factors are incorporated in the 
study, results may change. In addition, daily bid-ask spreads in November 2018 are collected for 
every PSI-20 stocks. Opening/closing fees for stocks, borrowing costs and financing costs for 
CFDs are collected from SaxoBank available data. 
C. Procedure  
Our methodology is based on the literature of a small group of authors that studied abnormal 
returns around earnings season.16 In order to measure abnormal returns one has to find expected 
and actual returns. Actual returns are historical values. To obtain expected return, this paper uses 
the market model 17. An OLS regression is performed to estimate market model’s parameters using 
                                       
15 This allows for an actual 50/50 sample division, subject to minor differences due to market cap changes.  
16 Brown & Warner (1980 and 1985), Mackinlay (1997), Binder (1998) and Bartholdy et al. (2005) 
17 There are a wide variety of models such as the constant mean return model, multifactor model, Arbitrage pricing theory or CAPM, 
however the straightforwardness of the market model was a plus. Hence, this model is used throughout the paper. 
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an estimation period sample (250 trading days before the event window). In order to compute 
abnormal return portion in a given i  stock at time t  one must first compute ex-post returns. 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ,           1
( )
i i
i
i
P t P t n
R t n t
P t n
 
 

 
Being ( )iP t the closing price of stock i  at time t over a given time period of length n . The 
formula to calculate abnormal returns of security i  
 , ,( ) | ( )    2i i t i tAR t R E R t      
The last term in the equation denotes the normal return, , | ( )i tR t  is the ex-ante return of 
the stock i  at period t  conditioned by the information contained in the normal return model ( )t . 
Price performance for a given security can only be perceived as abnormal relative to a particular 
benchmark (in this case PSI-20 index). In this case, as mentioned previously market model is used 
to compute expected returns, and subsequently abnormal returns. The estimated parameters, stock 
i  and market index m  are then used to compute abnormal returns. This model bears in mind only 
one factor of risk – equity’s beta. The model regression generates a residual in each period for 
every security. This residual represents the abnormal return, rather than the expected error. When 
the market model is used, abnormal returns are computed by the difference between actual stock 
returns and stock returns derived from OLS estimation.18 Market model’s expression is given by, 
 ( ) ( ) (   ) 3i i mi iR t R t v t     
Where ,i tR  represents the actual stock i return during period t, ,m tR the return of market 
index m during period t, ,i i  the stock i model parameters and ,i tv  the residuals term. The 
conditional expected return is described as, 
                                       
18 Being market index the explanatory variable. 
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 , ( )   4| ( ) i i mi tE RR t t          
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. 
Abnormal Return is then defined as, 
 ( ) ( ) ( )   5i i mi iA t t RR R t    
In which ( )iAR t is the abnormal stock return of stock i  during period t  (this is performed 
for every period in the event window). Then, to aggregate all the abnormal returns across every 
PSI-20 securities one must compute ( )AR t , 
 
1
1
( ) ( )   6
n
i
i
AR t AR t
N 
   
After computing average abnormal returns, one has to measure the cumulative average 
abnormal returns across stocks for the entire event window. Let us compute the average cumulative 
abnormal returns, which is essentially the sum of all CARs divided by the number of samples, for 
any interval. 
 2
1
1 2 1
1
( , ) ( )   7
n t
ii t
CAR t t AR t
N 
    
When testing for statically significant returns one will use a parametric test that relies on 
the fact that returns are normally distributed.  
   1 2 1 2( , ) ~ 0, var ( , )    8CAR t t N CAR t t    
   ( ) ~ 0, var ( )    9AR t N AR t    
Let us test for whether AR and CAR are statistically different from zero. The null 
hypothesis being tested are: 
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0aH : There is not a significant average abnormal return at a given t  during the event 
window due earnings announcement. 
0bH : There is not a significant cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) at a given t  
during the event window due to earnings announcements.  
Hence, the cross sectional t-test for average abnormal return is defined as: 
 2    10
tAR
AR
t
N

  
Where
2
2
1 1
1 1
( ) ( )
1t
N N
i iAR
i i
AR t AR t
N N

 
 
  
  
  . 
On the other hand, the t-test for the average cumulative abnormal return is given by: 
 
,1 2
1 2
2
( , )
   11
t t
CAR
CAR
CAR t t
t
N

  
Where 
,1 2
2
2
1 2 1 2
1 1
1 1
( , ) ( , )
1t t
n n
i iCAR
i j
CAR t t CAR t t
N N

 
 
  
  
  for 1 1 2 2T t t T   . 
 
To ensure an efficient event study methodology in PSI-20 we guarantee a sample with at 
least 50 events to have a robust statistical significance and we also consider different samples 
according to stocks’ liquidity. Plus, if there is non-normality in stock returns on should use 
nonparametric tests instead of parametric ones.19  
 
                                       
19 Bartholdy et al. (2005) dedicated their investigation on the efficiency of the event study methodology in less liquid stock 
exchanges such as the Copenhagen Stock Exchange and they concluded that event studies could be efficiently performed in small 
stock exchanges, but these conditions should be taken into account. 
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IV. Results and Discussion – Event-study 
The results of the event study are divided in three sections. The first section presents the 
results of the general sample. The second section outlines the main deviations in the return’s 
abnormality with the introduction of a new variable: earnings surprise. The third section further 
divides positive, negative and no surprise stocks according to Liquidity (market cap) and 
momentum (52-week high). The graph (Appendix 1) exemplifies the process used in this paper. (*) 
means that the same factors were incorporated (to simplify process representations) in no surprise 
and negative surprise samples.  
A. Overall Sample 
This sample is composed of all 275 announcements from 2011-2015. The average cumulative 
abnormal return for the 21-day event is 0.19%.  Average cumulative abnormal return reaches its 
peak at day 7 (+0.62%), pointing towards a fairly short-term drift in stock’s price as new 
information is assimilated by the market. Focusing on the announcement day (day 0) the average 
abnormal return is 0.19% (Appendix 2), with a value 1  
20 of 2.05 and therefore accepting the null 
hypothesis that the event has no impact on the price of a given stock. Nevertheless, days 2, 7 and 
13 exhibit statistically significant abnormal returns.  
B. Earnings Surprise Sample 
In day 0 the three samples showed statistically significant returns (Appendix 3). In day 0, 
negative surprises yielded a 0.60% AR and, whereas positive surprises had the opposite behavior, 
with an AR of -0.38%. One possible explanation for this outcome is intra-day short term reversal, 
                                       
20 
1 , 2 correspond to the t-statistic values for the average abnormal returns and average cumulative abnormal returns, respectively. 
All the tests are performed for a 1% significance level. 
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meaning that strong earnings surprises (the average positive earnings surprise in the sample is 
24.1%) can lead to stronger price reactions and are more likely to experience a reversal in the first 
trading day after the announcement (market players are likely to pursue sell-at-highs intraday 
strategies originating a negative average return for that day).21 The opposite rationale is also valid 
for equities with negative surprises. Observing the 21-day period, CAR  in positive, negative and 
no surprise stocks is -0.11%, -0.77% and 0.80% respectively. Negative surprises lead to a short-
term portfolio adjustment (as the investor sentiment is negative) and therefore a bearish tendency 
is witnessed in general for every stock. Positive surprises follow a slight price correction in the 
following days. This is unexpected, but one possible explanation is the time that market takes to 
digest reported earnings and normally peak results (high surprise on earnings announced) increase 
investor’s risk aversion since they could mean weaker quarters in the future. If this occurs, then is 
very likely to observe an increase in profit taking orders, and therefore there is a  price correction 
in the following days after a positive surprise. No surprise sample accounts for both Actual EPS = 
Forecasted EPS (5.15 % of the entire sample)22 and stocks with no forecasted EPS (and therefore 
no reported surprise, representing 49.5% of the entire sample). No surprise category was supposed 
to not convey any relevant information to the market, however a positive price drift is observed. 
Although there are no analysts to forecast EPS, these stocks make news around earnings 
announcements – whether good, bad or neutral. Researchers state that these equities have high 
trading volume and high net buying by investors, according Attention-Grabbing Hypothesis, and 
therefore have a marked drift.23 
                                       
21 This pattern is observed in PSI-20. For instance, stock’s price in the first hours of trading witnesses a substantial increase that 
tends to reverse afterwards as the amount of short positions increases. 
22 This particular sample of 30 events (5.15% of the entire sample) was not considered alone due to low statistical significance. 
23 According to this hypothesis, investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks. Prices are therefore pushed upwards as buy 
orders are more than sell orders. That is, the publication issued for a given stock catches investors’ attention irrespective of their 
nature (positive, negative or neutral). 
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Figure 2. Plot of average cumulative returns across all events from day 0 to day 20, according to the 
earnings surprise. Recall that abnormal return is calculated using market model as the normal return. 
C. Incorporating Momentum and Liquidity Factors 
Market reaction to a stock with positive, negative or no surprise earnings could be exacerbated 
or hindered depending on stock’s momentum and liquidity. 52-week high is used as a proxy for 
momentum and three categories are explored: i) near the high (NH), ii) at the high (AH) and iii) far 
from the high (FH). Market capitalization is used as a proxy for liquidity and two categories are 
explored: i) liquid and ii) illiquid. 
1. Positive Earnings Surprises 
In the previous analysis, PEAD does not seem to exist for positive earnings.24 Nonetheless, this 
outcome may change when exploring this sample according to stock’s momentum and liquidity. In 
the momentum category, within the 21-day event there is a 58.7% of abnormality in returns 
(Appendix 10).25 All the three sub-samples display significant abnormal returns at the 
announcement date (Appendix 4), except for AH. Equities near and at the 52-week high exhibit a 
                                       
 
24 The drift is not in the direction of an earnings surprise. 
25 Number of days with significant abnormal returns as a percentage of the total days in the event window. 
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CAR  of 0.87% and 2.60% respectively. PEAD exists only for stocks at their 52-week high or near. 
One possible justification is anchoring bias, since investors interpreted the impact of earnings 
surprises according to its proximity to the 52-week high leading them to consider that information 
has already been assimilated into stock’s price. Therefore, they tend to underestimate further news 
on the firm’s future outlook, leading to a consequent positive price drift (opposite rational for far 
from the high stocks). Hence, momentum explains PEAD for equities with positive earnings. On 
the other hand, liquidity does not clarify for PEAD, since both liquid and illiquid sub-samples 
(Appendix 5) yield negative CAR  (-0.03% and -0.26% respectively). Although abnormal returns 
are significant for a substantial part of the interval (21 days), the drift is not in the same direction 
as the earnings surprise. Hence, there is evidence that abnormal returns around earnings 
announcements are not related with PEAD. Following our initial thoughts, illiquidity can 
exacerbate intra-day short term reversal, due to higher bid-ask spreads and the price being easily 
influenced by investors (high volume trading when investors want to corner the market).  
 
Figure 3. Plot of average cumulative returns across positive surprise stocks from day 0 to day 20, according to their liquidity and 
momentum. 
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2. Negative Earnings Surprise 
PEAD seems to exist for negative surprises, specifically in liquid (Appendix 6) and far-from-
high stocks (Appendix 7). FH sub-sample has a CAR  of -1.09%. As previously mentioned, 
investors seem to interpret the impact of earnings surprises according to stock’s proximity to 52-
week high. When the stock is far from the high, investors may not underestimate the impact of 
news and the drift moves in the same direction of the earnings surprise. AH and NH samples had 
positive results (3.43% and 0.90% respectively) meaning that investors relied heavily on the first 
piece of information given – price performance). Hence, stocks with negative earnings surprises 
do not witness a negative price drift when their prices are near 52-week high. One possible 
explanation for the outcome in liquidity sub-sample is that the return asymmetry surrounding 
earnings announcements is weaker for more liquid stocks because their prices reflect negative news 
more timely and so the drift is in the same direction as earnings surprise ( CAR  of -1.64%). 
Conversely, asymmetry becomes stronger as liquidity risk increases ( CAR  of 0.19%). 
 
Figure 4. Plot of average cumulative returns across negative surprise stocks from day 0 to day 20, according to their liquidity and 
momentum. 
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3. No Surprise 
At the announcement date, if a given stock is AH, NH or FH (Appendix 8) it shows a CAR  of 
-3.27%, 0.51% and 1.07% respectively. Stocks far from the high experience a more positive drift 
since investors tend to have lack of hard reporting data, and therefore exists a higher upside 
potential for speculation when compared with stocks closer to their 1-year historical maximum. 
The opposite rationale is also valid, and therefore NH sub-sample experienced the higher price 
correction. All categories show significant AR at the announcement date, except for NH category. 
Liquid equities (evidence of AR in day 0) show a higher CAR  (Appendix 9) than illiquid stocks 
(1.01% vs. 0.38%). Companies with no surprise are more illiquid than companies with 
positive/negative surprises, possibly because of a higher information asymmetry or uncertainty 
among released news, therefore makes sense that the price drift in no surprise category is mainly 
influenced by illiquid stocks.  
 
Figure 5. Plot of average cumulative returns across no surprise stocks from day 0 to day 20, according to their liquidity and 
momentum. 
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 Overall, investors’ trading relies more on stock’s momentum rather than earnings surprise 
(whether positive or negative). On the other, if there is absence of hard data release (no earnings 
surprise) speculative investment explains the drift (rather than anchoring bias). The table below 
summarizes the average abnormal return (at the announcement day) and average cumulative 
abnormal return during the 21-day event window: 
Table 1 – Average AR (at day 0) and CAR in the event window, according to stock’s liquidity and momentum. 
 
V. Results and Discussion – Investment Strategy 
After using an event-study methodology to test the significance of AR and CAR , this paper 
intends to implement a feasible investment strategy (accounting for transaction costs) that mimics 
major findings in the previous event study. Chordia (2009) showed that transaction costs inhibit 
the exploitation of PEAD. The period of the out-of-sample back testing is performed from 01-01-
2015 until 01-01-2017. On this paper we develop 8 trading strategies with a 20 days holding period. 
This paper seeks to improve trading strategies by incorporating new variables, as explained before. 
These strategies are Equity-Long Only and Equity Long-Short. Generally, for long positions a 
return of ln t
n
X
k
X
 
 
 
is generated, where for short positions a return of ln t
n
X
k i s
X
 
    
 
is 
obtained. tX  is the opening price of the stock at day 1 (one day after market reaction to the 
announcement) and nX  represents the last day of the holding period (in this case, day 20). k  
represents the transactions costs including bid-ask spread and opening/closing fee, i  the borrowing 
costs and s  the financing costs. 
NH FH AH Liquid Illiquid NH FH AH Liquid Illiquid
Positive Earnings Surprise 0,87% -1,09% 2,60% -0,03% -0,26% -0,40% -0,37% 0,19% -0,26% -0,60%
Negative Earnings Surprise 0,90% -2,38% 3,43% -1,64% 0,19% 0,52% 0,68% 0,39% 0,56% 0,65%
No Earnings Surprise 0,51% 1,07% -3,27% 0,38% 1,01% 0,12% 0,48% 0,47% 0,09% 0,40%
CAR (%) AR (%) at day 0
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A. Transaction costs and Short-selling 
In the Portuguese stock market, liquidity is an important issue, and therefore transaction costs 
for long (Appendix 11) and short positions (Appendix 12) should be precisely incorporated. 
Transactions costs included are: 
a) Bid-ask spread: Average bid-ask spread specific for each company in the Portuguese stock 
index is computed (illiquidity tends to increase bid-ask spread). Historical data from daily 
closing prices, in the last month (November 2018), was collected for all companies in PSI-
20. 
b) Initial fee: fee incurred when opening/closing positions. A total value (for opening and 
closing a long/short position in a given stock) of 10 bps is used (average cost applied by 
brokers in Portugal). 
c) Borrowing and Financing costs: for the average investor short selling equities in Portuguese 
market could be performed using CFDs (10 bps is also used as opening and closing fee). 
First, the financing costs associated with this derivative, with a holding period higher than 
one day, is an interest equivalent to
Holding Period in days
LIBID Fixed Spread
360
 
  
 
. 26 
The fixed spread is 3% and LIBID is -0.456%.27 For short positions, there exist also 
borrowing costs that depend on the liquidity of the underlying stocks, hence borrowing 
costs are liquidity-specific and vary across stocks. Note that is not possible to short sell all 
stocks available in PSI-20 due to high liquidity risk (their short sell status in constantly 
                                       
26 When holding a short position in CFDs, the investor receives a credit calculated based on the relevant inter-bank bid rate 
depending on the currency of the underlying asset deducted from a fixed mark-up (spread). If the calculated financing costs in a 
short position are negative, the financing credit is, in fact, a financing charge. Values provided by SaxoBank.  
27 LIBID rate is not publicly available, therefore we used LIBOR rate minus 1/8 of 1% (by convention) as a proxy. 11 December 
2018 Euro LIBOR overnight rate was used and collected from Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). 
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changing due to market and liquidity conditions). Nonetheless, this paper assumes 
theoretically that it is possible to enter in a short position for every single stock.28  
d) Spread CFD/Equity: the difference between tradable bid and ask prices between CFDs and 
its underlying, equity. One will consider 10 bps as an average spread in PSI-20 stocks.29 
B. Rationale and Results of Investment Strategies 
These strategies are based on the patterns observed in section Results and Discussion. Overall 
Strategy (Strategy 1) takes advantage of PEAD (positive drift) in PSI-20 and therefore a long-only 
portfolio is designed. Earnings Surprise Strategy (Strategy 2) also considers earnings surprise 
(positive, negative or no surprise) and goes long on companies that have no surprise on their EPS 
surprise (explained by attention-grabbing hypothesis) and short companies that positive (due to 
intra-day short term reversal) and negative surprises (due to negative price drift). Positive earnings 
with momentum strategy (Strategy 3) is designed with a long position in AH/NH stock’s with 
positive earnings and short on FH equities. Anchoring bias, as mentioned before, is the rationale 
behind the trading strategy. Positive surprises with Liquidity strategy (Strategy 4) is an equity-short 
only strategy, with short positions in bot liquid and illiquid equities with positive surprises (since 
it enhances intra-day short term reversal). Negative Surprises with momentum strategy (Strategy 
5) relies on the investor’s misinterpretation of stock’s nearness to 52-week high (mentioned 
earlier), with long positions in AH and NH, and short positions in FH stocks. Negative surprises 
with liquidity strategy (Strategy 6) goes long on illiquid stocks (return asymmetry surrounding 
earnings announcements increases with illiquidity) and short on liquid firms (negative price drift). 
No surprises with momentum strategy (Strategy 7) is a Long-short equity strategy, going short AH 
                                       
28 In this case, borrowing cost assumed are the average borrowing cost in the Portuguese stock market for the companies that is 
possible to short sell plus 1% called a liquidity premium. 
29 SaxoBank values, that change across investor profile. The values used in this paper are typical of a risk averse investor. 
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firms and long on FH and NH (no hard data to support the decision and therefore upside potential 
for speculation is higher for stocks far from 52-week high). No surprises with liquidity strategy 
(strategy 8) is a long-only equity strategy with long positions on liquid and illiquid firms with no 
surprises (attention-grabbing hypothesis is enhanced as illiquidity increases). The following table 
presents the results for the 8 strategies implemented: 
Table 2 – Comparison between trading strategies. 
 
 The following graph shows the pattern of cumulative returns for the 8 strategies designed: 
 
Figure 6. Cumulative return of the Trading strategies (1-8) implemented, during the 20-day holding period. 
To have a successful strategy, the trading strategy should have an optimal accuracy and risk 
to reward ratio. As it can be concluded from the analysis of the average cumulative return (net 
return, including transaction costs) during the 20-day holding period just one strategy presents 
Info Sharpe Annualized Retun Volatility % Positive days % negative days Max Drawdown Skewness Kurtosis Accuracy Average TC/day
Strategy 1 0,49 1,24% 2,54% 55,00% 45,00% -0,87% -0,38 0,69 57,55% 0,02%
Strategy 2 1,13 6,03% 5,36% 61,67% 38,33% -1,28% -0,32 -0,13 59,71% 0,05%
Strategy 3 0,20 2,32% 11,50% 51,67% 48,33% -1,25% 0,88 1,77 56,76% 0,05%
Strategy 4 1,47 37,47% 25,48% 62,50% 37,50% -3,47% -0,58 0,62 51,43% 0,06%
Strategy 5 -0,63 -10,52% 16,82% 55,00% 45,00% -4,37% -0,44 3,28 41,67% 0,04%
Strategy 6 0,01 0,32% 35,69% 52,50% 47,50% -2,94% 0,92 2,74 63,64% 0,04%
Strategy 7 1,78 23,57% 13,21% 58,33% 41,67% -2,39% -0,68 3,07 65,12% 0,04%
Strategy 8 1,61 26,35% 16,33% 65,00% 35,00% -1,86% -0,18 0,62 64,63% 0,02%
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negative return. Therefore, strategy 5 is not worthy to engage (IS < 0). Moreover, the presence of 
high drawdowns (relative to the 20-day period) in strategies 4 and 5 hinders the possible 
implementation of such models. It seems that strategy 7 has the best risk-return reward, being 
translated into a higher Sharpe ratio. With strategies 7 and 8 we achieve a better accuracy (65.12% 
and 64.63%) and maximum Sharpe ratio of 1.78 and 1.61, respectively. Strategy 8 experiences 
more stable cumulative returns and lower drawdowns (Table 2). In fact, we conclude that strategy 
8 results in an optimized and more consistent strategy that outperforms the others. Additionally, 
the average cumulative return considering all the 8 strategies is 1.62%, and the average transaction 
costs for the 20-day holding period performs a total of 78bp. This accounts for 48.5% of the average 
cumulative returns. Just as an example, strategy 1 yields an Info Sharpe of 0.49 (when including 
transaction costs) versus 2.49 without. Therefore, engaging in short-term trading strategies like 
these ones substantially hinder profits. Illiquidity (larger bid-ask spreads) and short-selling increase 
significantly transaction costs. 30 
The main findings of this paper are consistent with previous results on the subject. Similarly 
to Alves and Santos (2005), who presents a relationship between financial information announced 
quarterly and investor’s decisions, our event-study on PSI-20 showed the existence of abnormal 
returns in the days 2, 7 and 13. Moreover, in agreement with Chordia (2009) we conclude that 
transaction costs do reduce PEAD, however do not inhibit it. When incorporating new factors like 
momentum, we must agree with Goh and Jeon (2017) that investors interpret impact of earnings 
news based on stock’s nearness to 52-week high, as the percentage of abnormality in the event 
window increases significantly with momentum. Additionally, our findings are in line with 
Schmitz (2007) since we find a larger drift for negative than positive stock’s surprises. Nonetheless, 
                                       
30 The topic is not further explored since it is not the main purpose of the paper. 
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most research papers disregard the potential of firms that do not have an EPS surprise (in line with 
forecasted or no analysts to forecast it), mainly with stocks trading in less liquid markets. Quite the 
opposite, we conclude that despite its increased volatility, trading stocks in PSI-20 which do not 
convey hard reporting data to the market, based on liquidity and momentum factors can yield an 
optimal financial performance in terms of Sharpe ratio and success rate (accuracy). In fact our 
findings are different from Forbes and Giannopoulos (2015) as we conclude that an increase in 
information uncertainty increased the strength of observed post-announcement earnings drift. 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, we study if there are abnormal returns in PSI-20 around earnings 
announcements. The present study focus on momentum and liquidity as factors that might affect 
post-announcement drift according to the surprise in each announcement, for every firm. First, we 
found that abnormal returns do exist in PSI-20. In fact, this market inefficiency is exacerbated when 
we compute abnormal returns for positive, negative and no surprises according to momentum and 
liquidity. Second, the out-of-sample results obtained in the investment strategies are robust except 
for negative earnings surprise with momentum (and therefore not generating a profitable trading 
strategy). Indeed, we demonstrated that that 50% of the trading strategies implemented yield an 
info Sharpe greater than one. Third, we concluded that transaction costs affect the profitability of 
trading strategies, and showed that the average cumulative returns are significantly lower when we 
include transaction costs. Overall, despite the presented drawbacks and assumptions, we conclude 
that there is the potential to take advantage of PEAD in PSI-20 to make feasible and efficient 
investment strategies. As for future researches, the event-study should be complemented with a 
pre-announcement analysis to study the extent at which PEAD is hindered by market inefficiencies 
prior to the announcement.  
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VIII. Appendix 
Appendix 1 - Example of the process used in the paper, when incorporating new variables to account for abnormal returns.  
 
Appendix 2 – Average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns in the overall sample from 2011-2015. 
 
All earnings announcements AR All earnings announcements CAR
Overall Overall 
0 0,19% 0,19%
1 -0,09% 0,09%
2 0,23% 0,32%
3 0,02% 0,34%
4 0,08% 0,42%
5 0,05% 0,46%
6 -0,04% 0,42%
7 0,20% 0,62%
8 -0,06% 0,56%
9 -0,10% 0,45%
10 -0,12% 0,34%
11 0,02% 0,35%
12 -0,13% 0,22%
13 0,18% 0,40%
14 0,00% 0,40%
15 -0,01% 0,39%
16 -0,02% 0,37%
17 -0,02% 0,34%
18 -0,04% 0,31%
19 -0,14% 0,17%
20 0,02% 0,19%
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Appendix 3 – Average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns according to different earnings surprises, from 2011-2015. 
 
Appendix 4 – Average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for positive earnings surprises according to stock’s 
momentum from 2011-2015. 
 
 
No Surprise Negative Surprise Positive Surprise No Surprise Negative Surprise Positive Surprise
0 0,31% 0,60% -0,38% 0,31% 0,60% -0,38%
1 -0,14% -0,27% 0,15% 0,16% 0,33% -0,24%
2 0,17% 0,16% 0,39% 0,33% 0,50% 0,16%
3 -0,05% 0,26% -0,07% 0,29% 0,75% 0,09%
4 0,18% -0,12% 0,07% 0,46% 0,64% 0,15%
5 0,32% -0,18% -0,27% 0,78% 0,46% -0,12%
6 0,00% -0,12% -0,06% 0,78% 0,33% -0,18%
7 0,28% 0,05% 0,15% 1,07% 0,39% -0,03%
8 0,23% -0,44% -0,27% 1,29% -0,06% -0,29%
9 -0,04% -0,18% -0,17% 1,26% -0,23% -0,46%
10 -0,18% -0,30% 0,15% 1,08% -0,53% -0,31%
11 0,05% -0,13% 0,09% 1,12% -0,66% -0,22%
12 -0,22% -0,11% 0,02% 0,91% -0,77% -0,20%
13 0,37% 0,10% -0,12% 1,28% -0,67% -0,33%
14 -0,08% 0,03% 0,12% 1,21% -0,65% -0,21%
15 -0,11% 0,00% 0,16% 1,10% -0,65% -0,05%
16 0,18% -0,16% -0,28% 1,28% -0,81% -0,33%
17 -0,07% 0,13% -0,06% 1,20% -0,68% -0,39%
18 -0,26% 0,47% -0,04% 0,94% -0,21% -0,44%
19 -0,22% -0,31% 0,17% 0,72% -0,52% -0,27%
20 0,08% -0,25% 0,16% 0,80% -0,77% -0,11%
Earnings Surprise AR Earnings Surprise CAR
Near High Far High At High Near High Far High At High
0 -0,40% -0,37% 0,19% -0,40% -0,37% 0,19%
1 0,30% -0,01% 0,55% -0,10% -0,38% 0,74%
2 0,09% 0,69% -0,09% 0,00% 0,31% 0,65%
3 0,09% -0,23% 0,89% 0,09% 0,08% 1,54%
4 0,32% -0,19% 0,58% 0,41% -0,10% 2,12%
5 -0,23% -0,31% -0,85% 0,18% -0,41% 1,27%
6 -0,31% 0,20% -0,46% -0,14% -0,21% 0,81%
7 0,13% 0,17% 0,36% -0,01% -0,04% 1,17%
8 -0,27% -0,27% 0,03% -0,27% -0,31% 1,20%
9 -0,27% -0,06% -0,11% -0,54% -0,37% 1,09%
10 0,40% -0,11% -0,05% -0,14% -0,48% 1,04%
11 0,08% 0,10% -0,24% -0,06% -0,38% 0,79%
12 0,40% -0,37% 0,68% 0,34% -0,75% 1,47%
13 -0,27% 0,03% -0,56% 0,07% -0,72% 0,91%
14 0,12% 0,12% 0,28% 0,19% -0,60% 1,20%
15 0,26% 0,06% 0,64% 0,45% -0,54% 1,83%
16 -0,04% -0,53% 0,22% 0,41% -1,07% 2,05%
17 0,23% -0,36% 0,07% 0,64% -1,43% 2,12%
18 -0,05% -0,04% -0,36% 0,59% -1,47% 1,76%
19 -0,01% 0,34% 0,20% 0,58% -1,13% 1,95%
20 0,29% 0,03% 0,64% 0,87% -1,09% 2,60%
Positive earnings surprise and Momentum AR Positive earnings surprise and Momentum CAR
32 
 
Appendix 5 – Average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for positive earnings surprises according to stock’s liquidity 
from 2011-2015. 
 
Appendix 6 – Average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for negative earnings surprises according to stock’s liquidity 
from 2011-2015. 
 
Liquid Illiquid Liquid Illiquid
0 -0,26% -0,60% -0,26% -0,60%
1 0,10% 0,24% -0,17% -0,37%
2 0,52% 0,16% 0,35% -0,20%
3 0,04% -0,27% 0,39% -0,48%
4 -0,04% 0,26% 0,35% -0,22%
5 -0,05% -0,68% 0,30% -0,90%
6 0,05% -0,26% 0,36% -1,16%
7 0,19% 0,07% 0,55% -1,09%
8 -0,26% -0,28% 0,29% -1,37%
9 -0,30% 0,09% -0,01% -1,28%
10 0,01% 0,40% 0,00% -0,88%
11 -0,03% 0,31% -0,03% -0,57%
12 0,15% -0,22% 0,12% -0,79%
13 -0,05% -0,26% 0,07% -1,05%
14 0,05% 0,24% 0,12% -0,81%
15 -0,20% 0,82% -0,08% 0,01%
16 -0,14% -0,55% -0,22% -0,54%
17 -0,02% -0,13% -0,24% -0,68%
18 -0,30% 0,44% -0,55% -0,24%
19 0,24% 0,03% -0,31% -0,20%
20 0,28% -0,06% -0,03% -0,26%
Positive earnings surprise and Liquidity AR Positive earnings surprise and Liquidity CAR
Liquid Illiquid Liquid Illiquid
0 0,56% 0,65% 0,56% 0,65%
1 -0,54% 0,03% 0,02% 0,68%
2 0,23% 0,08% 0,25% 0,76%
3 0,30% 0,21% 0,55% 0,97%
4 -0,05% -0,19% 0,50% 0,79%
5 0,11% -0,50% 0,61% 0,29%
6 -0,25% 0,02% 0,35% 0,31%
7 -0,55% 0,71% -0,19% 1,02%
8 -0,35% -0,54% -0,55% 0,48%
9 -0,31% -0,03% -0,86% 0,46%
10 -0,28% -0,31% -1,14% 0,15%
11 -0,19% -0,07% -1,33% 0,08%
12 -0,12% -0,11% -1,45% -0,03%
13 -0,05% 0,27% -1,50% 0,23%
14 -0,12% 0,18% -1,61% 0,42%
15 -0,16% 0,17% -1,78% 0,59%
16 -0,13% -0,19% -1,91% 0,40%
17 0,41% -0,17% -1,51% 0,23%
18 0,36% 0,60% -1,15% 0,82%
19 -0,31% -0,30% -1,46% 0,53%
20 -0,18% -0,33% -1,64% 0,19%
Negative earnings surprise and Liquidity AR Negative earnings surprise and Liquidity CAR
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Appendix 7 – Average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for negative earnings surprises according to stock’s 
momentum from 2011-2015. 
 
Appendix 8 – Average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for no earnings surprises according to stock’s momentum 
from 2011-2015. 
 
Near High Far High At High Near High Far High At High
0 0,52% 0,68% 0,39% 0,52% 0,68% 0,39%
1 -0,58% 0,04% 0,13% -0,06% 0,72% 0,52%
2 0,11% 0,22% 0,74% 0,05% 0,93% 1,25%
3 0,30% 0,22% 0,50% 0,35% 1,15% 1,76%
4 0,03% -0,26% 0,32% 0,38% 0,89% 2,08%
5 0,22% -0,57% 0,54% 0,60% 0,32% 2,62%
6 0,01% -0,25% -0,36% 0,61% 0,07% 2,26%
7 0,04% 0,06% -0,09% 0,65% 0,13% 2,17%
8 0,29% -1,16% 0,42% 0,95% -1,03% 2,59%
9 -0,10% -0,25% 0,28% 0,84% -1,27% 2,87%
10 -0,51% -0,09% -0,35% 0,34% -1,36% 2,52%
11 0,19% -0,44% -0,41% 0,52% -1,81% 2,10%
12 0,32% -0,53% 0,78% 0,84% -2,34% 2,89%
13 -0,14% 0,34% 0,20% 0,70% -2,00% 3,09%
14 0,09% -0,04% 0,23% 0,79% -2,04% 3,32%
15 0,24% -0,24% -0,85% 1,03% -2,28% 2,47%
16 0,11% -0,42% -0,59% 1,14% -2,70% 1,88%
17 -0,04% 0,29% 0,54% 1,10% -2,41% 2,42%
18 0,12% 0,81% 0,16% 1,22% -1,60% 2,58%
19 -0,25% -0,36% 0,12% 0,97% -1,96% 2,69%
20 -0,07% -0,43% 0,73% 0,90% -2,38% 3,43%
Negative earnings surprise and Momentum AR Negative earnings surprise and Momentum CAR
Near High Far High At High Near High Far High At High
0 0,12% 0,48% 0,47% 0,12% 0,48% 0,47%
1 -0,36% 0,06% -0,78% -0,24% 0,54% -0,31%
2 0,14% 0,20% 0,27% -0,10% 0,74% -0,04%
3 -0,08% -0,02% -1,44% -0,18% 0,72% -1,49%
4 0,37% 0,00% -0,49% 0,19% 0,72% -1,98%
5 0,01% 0,61% -1,56% 0,20% 1,33% -3,54%
6 0,12% -0,11% 0,43% 0,33% 1,21% -3,12%
7 0,02% 0,53% 0,17% 0,35% 1,75% -2,94%
8 0,39% 0,07% 1,67% 0,74% 1,82% -1,28%
9 -0,08% 0,01% 0,02% 0,66% 1,82% -1,25%
10 0,25% -0,58% 0,68% 0,90% 1,24% -0,57%
11 0,18% -0,08% -0,20% 1,08% 1,16% -0,77%
12 -0,46% 0,01% -1,81% 0,62% 1,17% -2,58%
13 0,26% 0,48% 0,23% 0,89% 1,65% -2,35%
14 -0,05% -0,10% -0,17% 0,84% 1,55% -2,51%
15 0,07% -0,28% -0,29% 0,91% 1,28% -2,80%
16 0,04% 0,31% 0,16% 0,95% 1,59% -2,64%
17 -0,07% -0,08% -1,09% 0,88% 1,50% -3,73%
18 -0,07% -0,44% 0,30% 0,81% 1,06% -3,43%
19 -0,17% -0,27% -0,03% 0,64% 0,79% -3,46%
20 -0,14% 0,28% 0,19% 0,51% 1,07% -3,27%
No earnings surprise and Momentum AR No earnings surprise and Momentum CAR
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Appendix 9 – Average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for no earnings surprises according to stock’s liquidity from 
2011-2015. 
 
Appendix 10 – Percentage of average AR and CAR in the event window 
 
Appendix 11 – Average transaction costs (TTC day) in Long positions. 
 
Appendix 12 – Average transaction costs (TTC day) in Short positions. 
 
Liquid Illiquid Liquid Illiquid
0 0,09% 0,40% 0,09% 0,40%
1 0,15% -0,27% 0,24% 0,13%
2 -0,20% 0,33% 0,04% 0,46%
3 0,10% -0,10% 0,14% 0,35%
4 0,22% 0,16% 0,36% 0,51%
5 0,38% 0,30% 0,74% 0,81%
6 -0,12% 0,05% 0,62% 0,86%
7 0,05% 0,39% 0,67% 1,25%
8 0,29% 0,20% 0,96% 1,45%
9 -0,08% -0,03% 0,88% 1,42%
10 -0,12% -0,21% 0,76% 1,21%
11 -0,07% 0,09% 0,69% 1,30%
12 -0,07% -0,30% 0,62% 1,00%
13 0,29% 0,42% 0,92% 1,42%
14 0,14% -0,17% 1,05% 1,25%
15 -0,11% -0,11% 0,95% 1,14%
16 -0,12% 0,32% 0,83% 1,46%
17 -0,33% 0,10% 0,50% 1,55%
18 0,23% -0,50% 0,73% 1,06%
19 -0,08% -0,29% 0,65% 0,77%
20 -0,26% 0,24% 0,38% 1,01%
No earnings surprise and Liquidity AR No earnings surprise and Liquidity CAR
Samples % of AR % of CAR
Overall 14,29% 14,29%
Ernings Surprise 46,03% 47,62%
Positive Surprise + Momentum 66,67% 58,73%
Negative Surprise + Momentum 73,02% 90,48%
No Surprise + Momentum 47,62% 80,95%
Positive Surprise + Liquidity 61,90% 45,24%
Negative Surprise + Liquidity 76,19% 61,90%
No Surprise + Liquidity 52,38% 64,29%
Trading Days
Long Positions 20
Initial Fee 0,10% 0,01%
Bid/Ask Spread 0,38% 0,02%
TTC day 0,48% 0,02%
Trading Days
Short Positions 20
Initial Fee 0,10% 0,01%
Bid/ask Spread 0,38% 0,02%
CFD/Equity Spread 0,10% 0,01%
Financiang Costs -0,03%
Borrowing Costs 0,003%
TTC day 0,06%
